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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the spread of disinformation on online platforms and micro-targeted data-
driven political advertising has become a serious concern in many countries around the world,
in  particular  as  regards  the  impact  this  practice  may  have  on  informed  citizenship  and
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democratic  systems.  In  April  2019,  for  the  first  time  in  the  country’s  modern  history,
Switzerland’s supreme court has overturned a nationwide referendum on the grounds that the
voters were not given complete information and that it "violated the freedom of the vote”. While
in this case it was the government that had failed to provide correct information, the decision
still comes as another warning of the conditions under which elections nowadays are being held
and as a confirmation of the role that accurate information plays in this process. There is limited
and sometimes even conflicting scholarly evidence as to whether today people are exposed to
more diverse political information or trapped in echo chambers, and whether they are more
vulnerable to political disinformation and propaganda than before (see, for example: Bruns,
2017, and Dubois & Blank, 2018). Yet, many claim so, and cases of misuse of technological
affordances and personal data for political goals have been reported globally.
The decision of Switzerland’s supreme court has particularly resonated in Brexit Britain where
the campaign ahead of the European Union (EU) membership referendum left too many people
feeling “ill-informed” (Brett, 2016, p. 8). Even before the Brexit referendum took place, the
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee complained about “the absence of ‘facts’ about
the case for and against the UK’s membership on which the electorate can base their vote”
(2016, p. 3). According to this, the voters in the United Kingdom were not receiving complete or
even truthful information, and there are also concerns that they might have been manipulated
by the use of bots (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016) and by the unlawful processing of personal data
(ICO, 2018a, 2018b).
The same concerns were raised in the United States during and after the presidential elections
in 2016. Several studies have shown evidence of the exposure of US citizens to social media
disinformation in the period around elections (see: Guess et al., 2018, and Allcott & Gentzkow,
2017). In other parts of the world, such as in Brazil and in several Asian countries, the means
and platforms for transmission of disinformation were somewhat different but the associated
risks have been deemed even higher.  The most prominent world media,  fact  checkers and
researchers  systematically  reported  about  the  scope  and  spread  of  disinformation  on  the
Facebook-owned and widely used messaging application WhatsApp in the 2018 presidential
elections in Brazil.  Freedom House warned that elections in some Asian countries, such as
India, Indonesia, and Thailand, were also afflicted by falsified content.
Clearly,  online  disinformation  and  unlawful  political  micro-targeting  represent  a  threat  to
elections around the globe. The extent to which certain societies are more resilient or more
vulnerable to the impact of these phenomena depends on different factors, including, among
other things, the status of journalism and legacy media, levels of media literacy, the political
context and legal safeguards (CMPF, forthcoming). Different political and regulatory traditions
play  a  role  in  shaping  the  responses  to  online  disinformation  and  data-driven  political
manipulation.  Accordingly,  these  range  from doing  nothing  to  criminalising  the  spread of
disinformation, as is the case with the Singapore’s law 1 which came into effect in October 2019.
While there seems to be more agreement that regulatory intervention is  needed to protect
democracy, the concerns over the negative impact of inadequate or overly restrictive regulation
on freedom of expression remain. In his recent reports (2018, 2019), UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression David Kaye warned against regulation that entrusts platforms with even
more powers to decide on content removals in very short  time frames and without public
oversight. Whether certain content is illegal or problematic on other grounds is not always a
straightforward decision and often depends on the context in which it is presented. Therefore, as
highlighted by the Transatlantic High Level Working Group on Content Moderation Online and
Freedom of Expression (2019), to require platforms to make these content moderation decisions
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in an automated way, without built-in transparency, and without notice or timely recourse for
appeal, contains risks for freedom of expression.
The European Commission (EC) has recognised the exposure of citizens to large scale online
disinformation  (2018a) and micro-targeting of voters based on the unlawful processing of
personal data (2018b) as major challenges for European democracies. In a response to these
challenges, and to ensure citizens’ access to a variety of credible information and sources, the EC
has put in place several measures which aim to create an overarching “European approach”.
This paper provides an analysis of this approach to identify the key principles upon which it
builds, and to what extent, if  at all,  they differ from the principles of “traditional” political
advertising and media campaign regulation during the electoral period. The analysis further
looks at how these principles are elaborated and whether they reflect the complexity of the
challenges identified.  The focus is  on the EU as  it  is  “articulating a more interventionist
approach”  to  the  relations  with  the  online  platform companies  (Flew et  al.,  2019,  p.  45).
Furthermore, due to the size of the European market, any relevant regulation can set the global
standard, as is the case with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the area of data
protection and privacy (Flew et al., 2019).
THE ROLE OF (SOCIAL) MEDIA IN ELECTIONS
The paper starts from the notion that a healthy democracy is dependent on pluralism and that
the role of (social) media in elections and the transparency of data-driven political advertising
are among the crucial components of any assessment of the state of pluralism in a given country.
In  this  view,  pluralism  “implies  all  measures  that  ensure  citizens'  access  to  a  variety  of
information sources,  opinion, voices etc.  in order to form their opinion without the undue
influence of one dominant opinion forming power” (EC, 2007, p. 5; Valcke et al., 2009, p. 2).
Furthermore, it implies the relevance of citizens' access to truthful and accurate information.
The media have long been playing a crucial role in election periods: serving, on one side, as
wide-reaching platforms for parties and candidates to deliver their messages, and, on the other,
helping voters to make informed choices. They set the agenda by prioritising certain issues over
others and by deciding on time and space to be given to candidates; they frame their reporting
within a certain field of meaning and considering the characteristics of different types of media;
and,  if  the  law allows,  they  sell  time and space  for  political  advertising  (Kelley,  1963).  A
democracy requires the protection of media freedom and editorial autonomy, but asks that the
media be socially responsible. This responsibility implies respect of fundamental standards of
journalism, such as impartiality and providing citizens with complete and accurate information.
As highlighted on several occasions by the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(so-called Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe (2013, paras. 48, 49): “The failure of
the media to provide impartial information about the election campaign and the candidates is
one of the most frequent shortcomings that arise during elections”.
Access to the media has been seen as “one of the main resources sought by parties in the
campaign period” and to ensure a level playing field “legislation regarding access of parties and
candidates to the public media should be non-discriminatory and provide for equal treatment”
(Venice  Commission,  2010,  para.  148).  The  key  principles  of  media  regulation  during  the
electoral period are therefore media impartiality and equality of opportunity for contenders.
Public service media are required to abide by higher standards of impartiality compared to
private outlets, and audiovisual media are more broadly bound by rules than the printed press
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and online media. The latter are justified by the perceived stronger effects of audiovisual media
on voters (Schoenbach & Lauf, 2004) and by the fact that television channels benefit from the
public and limited resource of the radio frequency spectrum (Venice Commission, 2009, paras.
24-28, 58).
In  the  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM)  2,  a  research  tool  supported  by  the  European
Commission and designed to assess risks to media pluralism in EU member states, the role of
media in the democratic electoral process is one out of 20 key indicators. It is seen as an aspect
of political pluralism and the variables against which the risks are assessed have been elaborated
in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. The indicator assesses the existence and
implementation of a regulatory and self-regulatory framework for the fair representation of
different political actors and viewpoints on public service media and private channels, especially
during election campaigns. The indicator also takes into consideration the regulation of political
advertising – whether the restrictions are imposed to allow equal opportunities for all political
parties and candidates.
The MPM results (Brogi et al., 2018) showed that the rules to ensure the fair representation of
political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on public service media channels and
services are imposed by law in all EU countries. It is, however, less common for such regulation
and/or self-regulatory measures to exist for private channels. A similar approach is observed in
relation to political advertising rules, which are more often and more strictly defined for public
service than for commercial media. Most countries in the EU have a law or another statutory
measure that imposes restrictions on political advertising during election campaigns to allow
equal opportunities for all  candidates. Even though political advertising is “considered as a
legitimate instrument for candidates and parties to promote themselves” (Holtz-Bacha & Just,
2017, p. 5), some countries do not allow it at all. In cases when there is a complete ban on
political  advertising,  public  service  media  provide  free  airtime  on  principles  of  equal  or
proportionate access. In cases when paid political advertising is allowed, it is often restricted
only to the campaign period and regulation seeks to set  limits  on,  for  example,  campaign
resources and spending, the amount of airtime that can be purchased and the timeframe in
which political  advertising can be broadcast.  In most  countries  there is  a  requirement for
transparency  –  how much  was  spent  for  advertising  in  the  campaign,  presented  through
spending on different types of media. For traditional media, the regulatory framework requires
that political advertising (as any other advertising) be properly identified and labelled as such.
Television remains the main source of news for citizens in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2018a,
2017). However, the continuous rise of online sources and platforms as resources for (political)
news and views (Eurobarometer, 2018a), and as channels for more direct and personalised
political communication, call for a deeper examination of the related practice and potential risks
to be addressed. The ways people find and interact with (political) news and the ways political
messages are being shaped and delivered to people has been changing significantly with the
global rise, popularity and features offered by the online platforms. An increasing number of
people, and especially young populations, are using them as doors to news (Newman et al.,
2018, p. 15; Shearer, 2018). Politicians are increasingly using the same doors to reach potential
voters, and the online platforms have become relevant, if not central, to different stages of the
whole  process.  This  means  that  platforms are  now increasingly  performing functions  long
attributed to media and much more through, for example, filtering and prioritising certain
content offered to users, and selling the time and space for political advertising based on data-
driven micro-targeting. At the same time, a majority of EU countries still do not have specific
requirements that would ensure transparency and fair play in campaigning, including political
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advertising in the online environment. According to the available MPM data (Brogi et al., 2018;
and  preliminary  data  collected  in  2019),  only  11  countries  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden) have legislation or
guidelines to require transparency of  online political  advertisements.  In all  cases,  it  is  the
general law on political advertising during the electoral period that also applies to the online
dimension.
Political advertising and political communication more broadly take on different forms in the
environment of online platforms, which may hold both promises and risks for democracy (see,
for example, Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016; and Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). There is still
limited evidence on the reach of online disinformation in Europe, but a study conducted by
Fletcher et al. (2018) suggests that even if the overall reach of publishers of false news is not
high, they achieve significant levels of interaction on social media platforms. Disinformation
online  comes  in  many  different  forms,  including  false  context,  imposter,  manipulated,
fabricated  or  extreme partisan  content  (Wardle  & Derakhshan,  2017),  but  always  with  an
intention to deceive (Kumar & Shah, 2018). There are also different motivations for the spread
of disinformation, including financial and political (Morgan, 2018), and different platforms’
affordances  affect  whether  disinformation spreads better  as  organic  content  or  as  paid-for
advertising. Vosoughi et al. (2018) have shown that Twitter disinformation organically travels
faster and further than true information pieces due to technological possibilities, but also due to
human  nature  that  is  more  likely  to  spread  something  surprising  and  emotional,  which
disinformation  often  does.  On  Facebook,  on  the  other  hand,  the  success  of  spread  of
disinformation may be significantly attributed to advertising, claim Chiou and Tucker (2018).
Accordingly, platforms have put in place different policies towards disinformation. Twitter has
recently announced a ban on political  advertising,  while Facebook continues to run it  and
exempts  politician’s  speech  and  political  advertising  from  third-party  fact-checking
programmes.
Further to different types of disinformation, and different affordances of platforms and their
policies, there are “many different actors involved and we’re learning much more about the
different  tactics  that  are  being used to  manipulate  the  online  public  sphere,  particularly
around elections”, warns Susan Morgan (2018, p. 40). Young Mie Kim and others (2018) have
investigated the groups that stood behind divisive issue campaigns on Facebook in the weeks
before the 2016 US elections, and found that most of these campaigns were run by groups which
did not file reports to the Federal Election Commission. These groups, clustered by authors as
non-profits,  astroturf/movement  groups,  and  unidentifiable  “suspicious”  groups,  have
sponsored four times more ads than those that did file the reports to the Commission. In
addition  to  the  variety  of  groups  playing  a  role  in  political  advertising  and  political
communication on social media today, a new set of tactics are emerging, including the use of
automated accounts, so-called bots, and data-driven micro-targeting of voters (Morgan, 2018).
Bradshaw  and  Howard  (2018)  have  found  that  governments  and  political  parties  in  an
increasing number of countries of different political regimes are investing significant resources
in using social media to manipulate public opinion. Political bots, as they note, are used to
promote or attack particular politicians, to promote certain topics, to fake a follower base, or to
get opponents’ accounts and content removed by reporting it on a large scale. Micro-targeting,
as another tactic, is commonly defined as a political advertising strategy that makes use of data
analytics to build individual or small group voter models and to address them with tailored
political messages (Bodó et al.,  2017). These messages can be drafted with the intention to
deceive certain groups and to influence their behaviour, which is particularly problematic in the
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election period when the decisions of high importance for democracy are made, the tensions are
high and the time for correction or reaction is scarce.
The main fuel of contemporary political micro-targeting is data gathered from citizens’ online
presentation and behaviour, including from their social media use. Social media has also been
used  as  a  channel  for  distribution  of  micro-targeted  campaign  messages.  This  political
advertising  tactic  came  into  the  spotlight  with  the  Cambridge  Analytica  case  reported  by
journalist  Carole  Cadwalladr  in  2018.  Her  investigation,  based  on  the  information  from
whistleblower Christopher Wylie, revealed that the data analytics firm Cambridge Analytica,
which worked with Donald Trump’s election team and the winning Brexit campaign, harvested
the personal data of millions of peoples' Facebook profiles without their knowledge and consent,
and used it for political advertising purposes (Cadwalladr, 2018). In the EU, the role of social
media in elections came high on the agenda of political institutions after the Brexit referendum
in 2016. The focus has been in particular on the issue of ‘fake news’ or disinformation. The
reform of the EU’s data protection rules, which resulted in the GDPR, started in 2012. The
Regulation was adopted on 14 April 2016, and its scheduled time of enforcement, 25 May 2018,
collided with the outbreak of the Cambridge Analytica case.
PERSPECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
Although, European elections are primarily the responsibility of national governments, the EU
has taken several steps to tackle the issue of online disinformation. In the Communication of 26
April 2018 the EC called these steps a “European approach” (EC, 2018a), with one of its key
deliverables being the Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018), presented as a self-regulatory
instrument that should encourage proactivity of online platforms in ensuring transparency of
political  advertising and restricting the automated spread of  disinformation.  The follow up
Commission’s  Communication  from  September  2018,  focused  on  securing  free  and  fair
European elections (EC, 2018f), suggests that, in the context of elections, principles set out in
the  European  approach  for  tackling  online  disinformation  (EC,  2018a)  should  be  seen  as
complementary to the GDPR (Regulation, 2016/679). The Commission also prepared specific
guidance on the application of GDPR in the electoral context (EC, 2018d). It further suggested
considering  the  Recommendation  on  election  cooperation  networks  (EC,  2018e),  and
transparency of political  parties,  foundations and campaign organisations on financing and
practices (Regulation, 2018, p. 673). This paper provides an analysis of the listed legal and
policy instruments that form and complement the EU’s approach to tackling disinformation and
suspicious tactics of political advertising on online platforms. The Commission’s initiatives in
the area of combating disinformation contain also a cybersecurity aspect. However, this subject
is technically and politically too complex to be included in this specific analysis.
The EC considers online platforms as covering a wide range of activities, but the European
approach  to  tackling  disinformation  is  concerned  primarily  with  “online  platforms  that
distribute content, particularly social media, video-sharing services and search engines” (EC,
2018a). This paper employs the same focus and hence the same narrow definition of online
platforms.  The main research questions are:  which are  the key principles  upon which the
European approach to tackling disinformation and political manipulation builds; and to what
extent, if at all, do they differ from the principles of “traditional” political advertising and media
campaign regulation in the electoral period? The analysis further seeks to understand how these
principles are elaborated and whether they reflect the complexity of the challenges identified.
For this purpose, the ‘European approach’ is understood in a broad sense (EC, 2018f). Looking
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through the lens of pluralism, this analysis uses a generic inductive approach, a qualitative
research approach that allows findings to emerge from the data without having pre-defined
coding  categories  (Liu,  2016).  This  methodological  decision  was  made  as  this  exploratory
research sought not only to analyse the content of the above listed documents, but also the
context in which they came into existence and how they relate to one another.
TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: THE EUROPEAN
APPROACH IN CREATING FAIR AND PLURAL
CAMPAIGNING ONLINE
The actions currently contained in the EU’s approach to tackling online disinformation and
political  manipulation  derive  from  the  regulation  (GDPR),  EC-initiated  self-regulation  of
platforms  (Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation),  and  the  non-binding  Commission’s
communications and recommendations to the member states. While some of the measures, such
as data protection, have a long tradition and have only been evolving, some represent a new
attempt to  develop solutions  to  the  problem of  platforms (self-regulation).  In  general,  the
current European approach can be seen as primarily designed towards (i) preventing unlawful
micro-targeting of voters by protecting personal data; and (ii) combating disinformation by
increasing the transparency of political and issue-based advertising on online platforms.
PROTECTING PERSONAL DATA
The elections  of  May 2019 were  the  first  European Parliament  (EP)  elections  after  major
concerns about legality and legitimacy of the vote in US presidential election and the UK's Brexit
referendum. The May 2019 elections were also the first elections for the EP held under the
GDPR, which became directly applicable across the EU as of 25 May 2018. As a regulation, the
GDPR is directly binding, but does provide flexibility for certain aspects of the regulation to be
adjusted by individual member states. For example, to balance the right to data protection with
the right to freedom of expression, article 85 of the GDPR provides for the exemption of, or
derogation for, the processing of data for “journalistic purposes or the purpose of academic
artistic or literary expression”, which should be clearly defined by each member state. While the
GDPR provides  the tools  necessary to  address  instances of  unlawful  use of  personal  data,
including in the electoral context, its scope is still not fully and properly understood. Since it was
the very first time the GDPR was applied in the European electoral context,  the European
Commission published in  September 2018 the Guidance on the application of  Union data
protection law in the electoral context (EC, 2018d).
The data protection regime in the EU is not new, 3 even though it has not been well harmonised
and the data protection authorities (DPAs) have had limited enforcement powers. The GDPR
aims to address these shortcomings as it gives DPAs powers to investigate, to correct behaviour
and to impose fines up to 20 million Euros or,  in the case of a company, up to 4% of its
worldwide  turnover.  In  its  Communication,  the  EC  (2018d)  particularly  emphasises  the
strengthened powers of authorities and calls them to use these sanctioning powers especially in
cases of infringement in the electoral context. This is an important shift as the European DPAs
have historically been very reluctant to regulate political parties. The GDPR further aims at
achieving  cooperation  and  harmonisation  of  the  Regulation’s  interpretations  between  the
national DPAs by establishing the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The EDPB is made
up of the heads of national data protection authorities and of the European Data Protection
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Supervisor  (EDPS)  or  their  representatives.  The  role  of  the  EDPS  is  to  ensure  that  EU
institutions and bodies respect people's right to privacy when processing their personal data. In
March  2018,  the  EDPS published  an  Opinion  on  online  manipulation  and  personal  data,
confirming the growing impact of micro-targeting in the electoral context and a significant
shortfall in transparency and provision of fair processing of information (EDPS, 2019).
The Commission guidance on the application of GDPR in the electoral context (EC, 2018d)
underlines that it “applies to all actors active in the electoral context”, including European and
national political parties, European and national political foundations, platforms, data analytics
companies and public authorities responsible for the electoral process. Any data processing
should comply with the GDPR principles such as fairness and transparency, and for specified
purposes only. The guidance provides relevant actors with the additional explanation of the
notions of “personal data” and of “sensitive data”, be it collected or inferred. Sensitive data may
include political opinions, ethnic origin, sexual orientation and similar, and the processing of
such data is generally prohibited unless one of the specific justifications provided for by the
GDPR applies. This can be in the case where the data subject has given explicit, specific, fully
informed consent for processing; when this information is manifestly made public by the data
subject; when the data relate to “the members or to former members of the body or to persons
who have regular contact with”; or when processing “is necessary for reasons of substantial
public interest” (GDPR, Art. 9, para. 2). In a statement adopted in March 2019, the EDPB points
out that derogations of special data categories should be interpreted narrowly. In particular, the
derogation in the case when a person makes his or her ‘political opinion’ public cannot be used
to legitimate inferred data. Bennett (2016) also warns that vagueness of several terms used to
describe  exceptions  from  the  application  of  Article  9(1)  might  lead  to  confusion  or
inconsistencies  in  interpretation  as  processing  of  ‘political  opinions’  becomes  increasingly
relevant for contemporary political campaigning.
The principles of fairness and transparency require that individuals (data subjects) are informed
of the existence of the processing operation and its purposes (GDPR, Art. 5). The Commission’s
guidance clearly states that data controllers (those who make the decision on and the purpose of
processing, like political parties or foundations) have to inform individuals about key aspects
related  to  the  processing  of  their  personal  data,  including  why  they  receive  personalised
messages from different  organisations;  which is  the source of  the data when not  collected
directly from the person; how are data from different sources combined and used; and whether
the automated decision-making has been applied in processing.
Despite the strengthened powers and an explicit call to act more in the political realm (EC,
2018d), to date we have not seen many investigations by DPAs into political parties under the
GDPR. An exception is UK Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham. In May 2017, she
announced the launch of  a  formal  investigation into the use of  data analytics  for  political
purposes following the wrongdoings exposed by journalists, in particular Carole Cadwalladr,
during the EU Referendum, and involving parties, platforms and data analytics companies such
as Cambridge Analytica. The report of November 2018 concludes:
that there are risks in relation to the processing of personal data by many political
parties. Particular concerns include the purchasing of marketing lists and lifestyle
information  from  data  brokers  without  sufficient  due  diligence,  a  lack  of  fair
processing and the use of  third-party data analytics companies,  with insufficient
checks around consent (ICO, 2018a, p. 8).
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As a result of the investigation, the ICO sent 11 letters to the parties with formal warnings about
their practices, and in general it became the largest investigation conducted by a DPA on this
matter  and encompassing  different  actors,  not  only  political  parties  but  also  social  media
platforms, data brokers and analytics companies.
Several cases have been reported where the national adaptation of the GDPR does not fully meet
the requirements of recital 56 GDPR which establishes that personal data on people’s political
opinions may be processed “for reasons of public interest” if “the operation of the democratic
system in a  member state  requires  that  political  parties  compile”  such personal  data;  and
“provided that appropriate safeguards are established”. In November 2018 a question was raised
in the European Parliament on the data protection law adapting Spanish legislation to the
GDPR which allows “political parties to use citizens’ personal data that has been obtained from
web pages and other publicly accessible sources when conducting political  activities during
election campaigns”. As a member of the European Parliament Sophia in 't Veld, who posed the
question, highlighted: “Citizens can opt out if  they do not wish their data to be processed.
However, even if citizens do object to receiving political messages, they could still be profiled on
the basis of their political opinions, philosophical beliefs or other special categories of personal
data that fall under the GDPR”. The European Commission was also urged to investigate the
Romanian  GDPR implementation for similar concerns. Further to the reported challenges with
national adaptation of GDPR, in November 2019 the EDPS has issued the first ever reprimand
to an EU institution. The ongoing investigation into the European Parliament was prompted by
the Parliament’s use of a US-based political campaigning company NationBuilder to process
personal data as part of its activities relating to the 2019 EU elections.
COMBATING DISINFORMATION
In contrast to the GDPR, which is sometimes praised as “the most consequential regulatory
development in information policy in a generation” (Hoofnagle et al., 2019, p. 66), the EC has
decided to tackle fake news and disinformation through self-regulation, at least in the first
round. The European Council, a body composed of the leaders of the EU member states, first
recognised the threat  of  online disinformation campaigns in 2015 when it  asked the High
Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  to  address  the
disinformation campaigns by Russia (EC, 2018c). The Council is not one of the EU's legislating
institutions, but it defines the Union’s overall political direction and priorities. So, it comes as
no surprise that the issue of disinformation came high on the agenda of the EU, in particular
after the UK referendum and US presidential elections in 2016. In April 2018 the EC (2018a)
adopted a Communication on Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach. This is the
central document that set the tone for future actions in this field. In the process of its drafting,
the EC carried out consultations with experts and stakeholders, and used citizens’ opinions
gathered through polling. The consultations included the establishment of a High-Level Expert
Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG) in early 2018, which two months later
produced a Report (HLEG, 2018) advising the EC against simplistic solutions. Broader public
consultations  and  dialogues  with  relevant  stakeholders  were  also  held,  and  the  specific
Eurobarometer (2018b) poll was conducted via telephone interviews in all EU member states.
The findings indicated a high level of concern among the respondents for the spread of online
disinformation in their country (85%) and saw it as a risk for democracy in general (83%). This
urged the EC to act and the Communication on tackling online disinformation was a starting
point  and  the  key  document  in  understanding  the  European  approach  to  the  pressing
challenges.  The  Communication  builds  around  four  overarching  principles  and  objectives:
transparency, diversity of information, credibility of information, and cooperation (EC, 2018a).
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Transparency, in this view, means that it should be clear to users where the information comes
from, who the author is and why they see certain content when an automated recommendation
system  is  being  employed.  Furthermore,  a  clearer  distinction  between  sponsored  and
informative  content  should  be  made  and  it  should  be  clearly  indicated  who  paid  for  the
advertisement.  The diversity  principle  is  strongly  related to  strengthening so-called quality
journalism, 4  to rebalancing the disproportionate power relations between media and social
media platforms, and to increasing media literacy levels. The credibility, according to the EC, is
to be achieved by entrusting platforms to design and implement a system that would provide an
indication of  the  source  and information trustworthiness.  The fourth  principle  emphasises
cooperation between authorities at national and transnational level and cooperation of broad
stakeholders  in  proposing  solutions  to  the  emerging  challenges.  With  an  exception  of
emphasising  media  literacy  and  promoting  cooperation  networks  of  authorities,  the
Communication largely recommends that platforms design solutions which would reduce the
reach of manipulative content and disinformation, and increase the visibility of trustworthy,
diverse and credible content.
The  key  output  of  this  Communication  is  a  self-regulatory  Code  of  Practice  on  Online
Disinformation (CoP). The document was drafted by the working group composed of online
platforms, advertisers and the advertising industry, and was reviewed by the Sounding Board,
composed of academics, media and civil society organisations. The CoP was agreed by the online
platforms  Facebook,  Google  and  Twitter,  Mozilla,  and  by  advertisers  and  the  advertising
industry, and was presented to the EC in October 2018. The Sounding Board (2018), however,
presented a critical view on its content and the commitments laid out by the platforms, stating
that it “contains no clear and meaningful commitments, no measurable objectives” and “no
compliance or  enforcement tool”.  The CoP,  as  explained by the Commission,  represents  a
transitional measure where private actors are entrusted to increase transparency and credibility
of the online information environment. Depending on the evaluation of their performance in the
first 12 months, the EC is supposed to determine the further steps, including the possibility of
self-regulation being replaced with regulation (EC, 2018c). The overall assessment of the Code’s
effectiveness is expected to be presented in early 2020.
The  CoP builds  on  the  principles  expressed  in  the  Commission’s  Communication  (2018a)
through the actions listed in Table 1. For the purpose of this paper the actions are not presented
in the same way as in the CoP. THey are instead slightly reorganised under the following three
categories: Disinformation; Political advertising, Issue-based advertising.
Table 1: Commitments of the signatories of the Code of Practice on Online Disinformation
selected and grouped under three categories: disinformation, political advertising, issue-based






To disrupt advertising and monetisation
incentives for accounts and websites
which consistently misrepresent
information about themselves
To clearly label paid-for communication as such
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not limit freedom of
expression and excludes
commercial advertising
Implementing rating systems (on
trustworthiness), and report system (on
false content)
Enabling users to understand why they have been
targeted by a given advertisement
To invest in technology to prioritise
“relevant, authentic and authoritative
information” in search, feeds and other
ranked channels
  
Resources for users on how to recognise
and limit the spread of false news
  
In the statement on the first annual self-assessment reports by the signatories of the CoP, the
Commission acknowledged that some progress has been achieved, but warns that it “varies a lot
between signatories and the reports provide little insight on the actual impact of the self-
regulatory  measures  taken  over  the  past  year  as  well  as  mechanisms  for  independent
scrutiny”. The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) has been
supporting the EC in monitoring the implementation of the commitments made by Google,
Facebook and Twitter  under  the  CoP,  particularly  in  the  area  of  political  and issue-based
advertising.  In June 2019 ERGA released an interim Report  as  a  result  of  the monitoring
activities carried out in 13 EU countries, based on the information reported by platforms and on
the data available in their online archives of political advertising. While it stated “that Google,
Twitter and Facebook made evident progress in the implementation of the Code’s commitments
by creating an ad hoc procedure for the identification of political ads and of their sponsors and
by making their online repository of relevant ads publicly available”, it also emphasised that the
platforms have not met a request to provide access to the overall database of advertising for the
monitored period, which “was a significant constraint on the monitoring process and emerging
conclusions”  (ERGA,  2019,  p.  3).  Furthermore,  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  information
provided in the platforms’ repositories of political advertising (e.g., Ad Library), the information
was  “not  complete  and that  not  all  the  political  advertising  carried  on the  platforms was
correctly labelled as such” (ERGA, 2019, p. 3).
The  EC still  needs  to  provide  a  comprehensive  assessment  on  the  implementation  of  the
commitments under the CoP after an initial 12-month period. However, it is already clear that
the issue of the lack of transparency of the platforms’ internal operations and decision-making
processes remains and represents a risk. If  platforms are not amenable to thorough public
auditing, then the adequate assessment of the effectiveness of implementation when it comes to
self-regulation becomes impossible. The ERGA Report (2019) further warns that at this point it
is not clear what options for micro-targeting were offered to political advertisements nor if all
options are disclosed in the publicly available repositories of political advertising.
Further to the commitments laid down in the CoP and relying on social media platforms to
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increase transparency of political advertising online, the Commission Recommendation of 9
September 2018 (EC, 2018e), “encourages”, and asks member states to “encourage” further
transparency commitments  by  European and national  political  parties  and foundations,  in
particular:
information on the  political  party,  political  campaign or  political  support  group
behind paid online political advertisements and communications” [...] “information
on any  targeting  criteria  used  in  the  dissemination  of  such  advertisements  and
communications”  [...]  “make  available  on  their  websites  information  on  their
expenditure for online activities, including paid online political advertisements and
communications (EC, 2018e, p. 8).
The Recommendation (EC, 2018e) further advises member states to set up a national election
network, involving national authorities with competence for electoral matters, including data
protection  commissioners,  electoral  authorities  and  audio-visual  media  regulators.  This
recommendation is further elaborated in the Action plan (EC, 2018c) but, because of practical
obstacles, national cooperation between authorities has not yet become a reality in many EU
countries.
KEY PRINCIPLES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN APPROACH
This analysis has shown that the principles contained in the above mentioned instruments,
which form the basis  of  the European approach to combating disinformation and political
manipulation are: data protection; transparency; cooperation; mobilising the private sector;
promoting diversity and credibility of information; raising awareness; empowering the research
community.
Data protection and transparency principles related to personal data collection, processing and
use are contained in the GDPR. The requirement to increase transparency of  political  and
issues-based  advertising  and  of  automated  communication  is  currently  directed  primarily
towards platforms that have committed themselves to label and publicly disclose sponsors and
content of political and issues-based advertising, as well as to identify and label automated
accounts. Unlike with the traditional media landscapes where, in general, on the same territory,
media were broadcasting the same political advertising and messages to their audiences, in the
digital  information  environment  political  messages  are  being  targeted  and  shown only  to
specific profiles of voters with limited ability to track them to see which messages were targeted
to whom. To increase transparency on this level would require platforms to provide a user-
friendly repository of political ads, including searchable information on actual sponsors and
amounts spent. At the moment, they struggle with how to identify political and issue-based ads,
to distinguish them from other types of advertising, and to verify ad buyers’ identities (Leerssen
et al., 2019).
Furthermore,  the  European  approach  fails  to  impose  similar  transparency  requirements
towards political parties to provide searchable and easy to navigate repositories of the campaign
materials  used.  The  research  project  of  campaign  monitoring  during  the  2019  European
elections, showed that parties/groups/candidates participating in the elections were largely not
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 13 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
transparent  about  their  campaign  materials.  Materials  were  not  readily  available  on  their
websites or social media accounts nor did they respond to direct requests from researchers
(Simunjak et al., 2019). This warns that while it is relevant to require platforms to provide more
transparency  on  political  advertising,  it  is  perhaps  even  more  relevant  to  demand  this
transparency directly from political parties and candidates in elections.
In the framework of transparency, the European approach also fails to further emphasise the
need for political parties to declare officially to authorities and under a specific category the
amounts  spent  for  digital  (including  social  media)  campaigning.  At  present,  in  some  EU
countries (for example Croatia, see: Klaric, 2019), authorities with competences in electoral
matters do not consider social media as media and accordingly do not apply the requirements to
report spending on social media and other digital platforms in a transparent manner. This
represents a risk, as the monitoring of the latest EP elections has clearly showed that the parties
had  spent  both  extensive  time  and  resources  on  their  social  media  accounts  (Novelli  &
Johansson, 2019).
The diversity and credibility principles stipulated in the Communication on tackling online
disinformation  and  in  the  Action  plan  ask  from  platforms  to  indicate  the  information
trustworthiness, to label automated accounts, to close down fake accounts, and to prioritise
quality journalism. At the same time, clear definition or instructions on criteria to determine
whether an information or a source is trustworthy and whether it represents quality journalism
is not  provided.  Entrusting platforms with making these choices  without  the possibility  of
auditing their algorithms and decision-making processes represents a potential risk for freedom
of expression.
The signatories of the CoP have committed themselves to disrupt advertising and monetisation
incentives  for  accounts  and  websites,  which  consistently  misrepresent  information  about
themselves. But, what about accounts that provide accurate information about themselves but
occasionally engage in campaigns which might also contain disinformation? For example, a
political party may use data to profile and target individual voters or a small group of voters with
messages that are not completely false but are exaggerated, taken out of context or framed with
an intention to deceive and influence voters’ behaviour. As already noted, disinformation comes
in many different forms, including false context, imposter, manipulated or fabricated content
(Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). While the work of fact-checkers and flagging of false content are
not completely useless here, in the current state of play this is far from sufficient to tackle the
problems of disinformation, including in political advertising and especially of dark ads 5. The
efficiency  of  online  micro-targeting  depends  largely  on  data  and  profiling.  Therefore,  if
effectively implemented, the GDPR should be of use here by preventing the unlawful processing
of personal data.
Another important aspect of the European approach are stronger sanctions in cases when the
rules are not respected. This entails increased powers of authorities, first and foremost of DPAs
and increased fines under the GDPR. Data protection in the electoral context is difficult to
ensure if the cooperation between different authorities with competence for electoral matters
(such as data protection commissioners, electoral authorities and audio-visual media regulators)
is  not  established  and  operational.  While  the  European  approach  strongly  recommends
cooperation,  it  is  not  easily  achievable  at  a  member  state  level,  as  it  requires  significant
investments in capacity building and providing channels for cooperation. In some cases, it may
even require amendments to the legislative framework. The cooperation of regulators of the
same type at the EU level is sometimes hampered by the fact that their competences differ in
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different member states.
The CoP also contains a commitment on “empowering the research community”. This means
that the CoP signatories commit themselves to support research on disinformation and political
advertising by providing researchers access to data sets, or collaborating with academics and
civil  society  organisations  in  other  ways.  However,  the  CoP  does  not  specify  how  this
cooperation should work, the procedures for granting access and for what kind of data, or which
measures should researchers put  in place to ensure appropriate data storage,  security  and
protection. In the reflection on the platform’s progress under the Code, three Commissioners
warned that the “access to data provided so far still  does not correspond to the needs of
independent researchers”.
CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  has  given  an  overview  of  the  developing  European  approach  to  combating
disinformation and political manipulation during an electoral period. It provided an analysis of
the key instruments contained in the approach and drew out the key principles upon which it
builds: data protection; transparency; cooperation; mobilising the private sector; promoting
diversity  and  credibility  of  information;  raising  awareness;  empowering  the  research
community.
The principles of legacy media regulation in the electoral period are impartiality and equality of
opportunity for contenders. This entails balanced and non-partisan reporting as well as equal or
proportionate access to media for political parties (be it free or paid-for). If political advertising
is allowed, it is usually subject to transparency and equal conditions requirements: how much
was spent on advertising in the campaign needs to be presented through spending on different
types of media and reported to the competent authorities. The regulatory framework requires
that political advertising be properly labelled as such.
In the online environment, the principles applied to legacy media require further elaboration as
the problem of electoral disinformation cuts across a number of different policy areas, involving
a range of public and private actors. Political disinformation is not a problem that can easily be
compartmentalised into existing legal and policy categories. It is a complex and multi-layered
issue that requires a more comprehensive and collaborative approach when designing potential
solutions. The emerging EU approach reflects the necessity for that overall policy coordination.
The main fuel of online political campaigning is data. Therefore, the protection of personal data
and especially of “sensitive” data from abuse becomes a priority of any action that aims to
ensure free, fair and plural elections. The European approach further highlights the importance
of transparency. It calls on platforms to clearly identify political advertisements and who paid
for them, but it fails to emphasise the importance of having a repository of all the material used
in  the  campaign  provided  by  candidates  and  political  parties.  Furthermore,  a  stronger
requirement  for  political  parties  to  report  on  the  amounts  spent  on  different  types  of
communication channels (including legacy, digital and social media) is lacking in this approach,
as well as the requirement for platforms to provide more comprehensive and workable data on
sponsors and spending in political advertising.
The European Commission’s communication of the European approach claims that it aims to
address all  actors active in the electoral  context,  including European and national political
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parties  and foundations,  online platforms,  data  analytics  companies  and public  authorities
responsible for the electoral process. However, it seems that the current focus is primarily on
the platforms and in a way that enables them to shape the future direction of actions in the fight
against disinformation and political manipulation.
As regards the principle of cooperation, many obstacles, such as differences in competences and
capacities of  the relevant national  authorities,  have not been fully taken into account.  The
elections are primarily a national matter so the protection of the electoral process, as well as the
protection of media pluralism, falls primarily within the competence of member states. Yet, if
the approach to tackling disinformation and political manipulation is to be truly European,
there should be more harmonisation between authorities and approaches taken at national
levels.
While being a significant step in the creation of a common EU answer to the challenges of
disinformation and political manipulation, especially during elections, the European approach
requires further elaboration, primarily to include additional layers of transparency. This entails
transparency of political parties and of other actors on their actions in the election campaigns,
as  well  as  more  transparency  about  internal  processes  and  decision-making  by  platforms
especially  on actions of  relevance to pluralism, elections and democracy.  Furthermore,  the
attempt to propose solutions and relevant actions at the European level faces two constraints.
On the one hand, it faces the power of global platforms shaped in the US tradition, which to a
significant extent differs from the European approach in balancing freedom of expression and
data  protection.  On the  other  hand,  the  EU approach confronts  the  resilience  of  national
political  traditions  in  member  states,  in  particular  if  the  measures  are  based  on
recommendations and other soft instruments.
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 16 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
REFERENCES
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211
Bennett, C. J. (2016). Voter databases, micro-targeting, and data protection law: can political
parties campaign in Europe as they do in North America? International Data Privacy Law,
6(4), 261–275. https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipw021
Bodó, B., Helberger, N. & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Political micro-targeting: a Manchurian
candidate or just a dark horse?. Internet Policy Review, 6(4).
https://doi.org/10.14763/2017.4.776
Bradshaw, S. & Howard, P. N. (2018). Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of
Organised Social Media Manipulation [Report]. Computational Propaganda Research Project,
Oxford Internet Institute. Retrieved from https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf
Brett, W. (2016). It’s Good to Talk: Doing Referendums Differently. The Electoral Reform
Society’s report. Retrieved from https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/2016-EU-Referendum-its-good-to-talk.pdf
Brogi, E., Nenadic, I., Parcu, P. L., & Viola de Azevedo Cunha, M. (2018). Monitoring Media
Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 in the European Union,
FYROM, Serbia and Turkey [Report]. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom,
European University Institute. Retrieved from https://cmpf.eui.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Media-Pluralism-Monitor_CMPF-report_MPM2017_A.pdf
Bruns, A. (2017, September 15). Echo chamber? What echo chamber? Reviewing the evidence.
6th Biennial Future of Journalism Conference (FOJ17), Cardiff, UK. Retrieved from
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/113937/1/Echo%20Chamber.pdf
Cadwalladr, C. & Graham-Harrison, E. (2018, March 17) Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles
harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election
Chiou, L. & Tucker, C. E. (2018). Fake News and Advertising on Social Media: A Study of the
Anti-Vaccination Movement [Working Paper No. 25223]. Cambridge, MA: The National Bureau
of Economic Research. Retrieved from
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209929
https://doi.org/10.3386/w25223
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF). (forthcoming, 2020). Independent
Study on Indicators to Assess Risks to Information Pluralism in the Digital Age. Florence:
Media Pluralism Monitor Project.
Code of Practice on Disinformation (September 2018). Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation
Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 17 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976. Retrieved from
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018D0994&qid=1531826494620
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/234 of 14 February 2018 on enhancing the European
nature and efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament (OJ L 45,
17.2.2018, p. 40)
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201,
31.7.2002, p. 37)
Dubois, E., & Blank, G. (2018). The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of
political interest and diverse media. Information, Communication & Society, 21(5), 729–745.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1428656
Eurobarometer (2018a). Standard 90: Media use in the EU. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instr
uments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2215
Eurobarometer (2018b). Flash 464: Fake news and disinformation online. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instru
ments/flash/surveyky/2183
Eurobarometer (2017). Standard 88:. Media use in the EU. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instr
uments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2143
European Commission (EC). (2018a). Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM/2018/236. Retrieved
from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&from=EN
European Commission (EC). (2018b). Free and fair European elections – Factsheet, State of
the Union. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681
European Commission (EC). (2018c, December 5). Action Plan against Disinformation.
European Commission contribution to the European Council (5 December). Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-
disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf
European Commission (EC). (2018d, September 12). Commission guidance on the application of
Union data protection law in the electoral context: A contribution from the European
Commission to the Leaders' meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-data-protection-
law-electoral-guidance-638_en.pdf
European Commission (EC). (2018e, September 12). Recommendation on election cooperation
networks, online transparency, protection against cybersecurity incidents and fighting
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 18 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
disinformation campaigns in the context of elections to the European Parliament. Retrieved
from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-cybersecurity-
elections-recommendation-5949_en.pdf
European Commission (EC). (2018f). Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions: Securing free and fair European elections. COM(2018)637. Retrieved
from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-free-fair-elections-
communication-637_en.pdf
European Commission (EC). (2007). Media pluralism in the Member States of the European
Union [Commission Staff Working Document No. SEC(2007)32]. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/media_pluralism_s
wp_en.pdf
European Data Protection Board (EDPB). (2019). Statement 2/2019 on the use of personal data
in the course of political campaigns. Retrieved from https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-
tools/our-documents/ostalo/statement-22019-use-personal-data-course-political-
campaigns_en
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). (2018). Opinion 372018 on online manipulation
and personal data. Retrieved from https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-
19_online_manipulation_en.pdf
European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA). (2019, June). Report of the
activities carried out to assist the European Commission in the intermediate monitoring of the
Code of practice on disinformation [Report]. Slovakia: European Regulators Group for





Fletcher, R., Cornia, A., Graves, L., & Nielsen, R. K. (2018). Measuring the reach of “fake news”
and online disinformation in Europe. Retrieved from
https://www.press.is/static/files/frettamyndir/reuterfake.pdf
Flew, T., Martin, F., Suzor, N. P. (2019). Internet regulation as media policy: Rethinking the
question of digital communication platform governance. Journal of Digital Media and Policy,
10(1), 33–50. https://doi.org/10.1386/jdtv.10.1.33_1
Guess, A., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2018). Selective exposure to misinformation: evidence from
the consumption of fake news during the 2016 US presidential campaign [Working Paper].
Retrieved from https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf
High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG). (2018). Final
report [Report]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-
report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation
Hoofnagle, C.J. & van der Sloot, B., & Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. J. (2019). The European Union
general data protection regulation: what it is and what it means. Information &
Communications Technology Law, 28(1), 65–98.
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 19 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2019.1573501
Holtz-Bacha, C. & Just, M. R. (Eds.). (2018). Routledge Handbook of Political Advertising. New
York: Routledge.
House of Commons Treasury Committee. (2016, May 27). The economic and financial costs and
benefits of the UK’s EU membership. First Report of Session 2016–17. Retrieved from
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtreasy/122/122.pdf
Howard, P. N. & Kollanyi, B. (2016). Bots, #StrongerIn, and #Brexit: Computational
Propaganda during the UK-EU Referendum. ArXiv160606356 Phys. Retrieved from
https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06356
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). (2018a, July 11). Investigation into the use of data
analytics in political campaigns [Report to Parliament]. Retrieved from
https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-
into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). (2018b, July 11). Democracy disrupted? Personal
information and political influence. Retrieved from https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-
taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf
Kim, Y. M., Hsu, J., Neiman, D., Kou, C., Bankston, L., Kim, S. Y., Heinrich, R., Baragwanath,
R., & Raskutti, G. (2018). The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets behind Divisive Issue
Campaigns on Facebook. Political Communication, 35(4), 515–541.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1476425
Kelley, S. Jr. (1962). Elections and the Mass Media. Law and Contemporary Problems, 27(2),
307–326. Retrieved from
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2926&context=lcp
Klaric, J. (2019, March 28) Ovo je Hrvatska 2019.: za Državno izborno povjerenstvo teletekst je
medij, Facebook nije. Telegram. Retrieved from https://www.telegram.hr/politika-
kriminal/ovo-je-hrvatska-2019-za-drzavno-izborno-povjerenstvo-teletekst-je-
medij-facebook-nije/
Kreiss, D. l., & McGregor, S. C. (2018). Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The
Work of Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google with Campaigns During the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Cycle. Political Communication, 35(2), 155–177.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1364814
Valcke, P., Lefever, K., Kerremans, R., Kuczerawy, A., Sükosd, M., Gálik, M., … Füg, O. (2009).
Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-
Based Approach [Report]. ICRI, K.U. Leuven; CMCS, Central European University, MMTC,
Jönköping Business School; Ernst & Young Consultancy Belgium. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf
Kumar, S., & Shah, N. (2018, April). False information on web and social media: A survey.
arXiv:1804.08559 [cs]. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.08559.pdf
Leerssen, P., Ausloos, J., Zarouali, B., Helberger, N., & de Vreese, C. H. (2019). Platform ad
archives: promises and pitfalls. Internet Policy Review, 8(4).
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 20 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1421
Liu, L. (2016). Using Generic Inductive Approach in Qualitative Educational Research: A Case
Study Analysis. Journal of Education and Learning, 5(2), 129–135.
https://doi.org/10.5539/jel.v5n2p129
Morgan, S. (2018). Fake news, disinformation, manipulation and online tactics to undermine
democracy. Journal of Cyber Policy, 3(1), 39–43.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2018.1462395
Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Kalogeropoulos, A., Levy, D. A. L., & Nielsen, R. K. (2018). Digital
News Report 2018. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Retrieved from
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/digital-news-report-2018.pdf
Novelli, E. & Johansson, B. (Eds.) (2019). 2019 European Elections Campaign: Images,Topics,
Media in the 28 Member States [Research Report]. Directorate-General of Communication of
the European Parliament. Retrieved from https://op.europa.eu/hr/publication-detail/-
/publication/e6767a95-a386-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en?fbclid=IwAR0C9R6Mw0Gd5aggB7wZx6KGWt3is84M210q3rv0g9LbXJqJpXuha1H6yeQ
Regulation (EU, Euratom). 2018/673 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the
statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. Retrieved
from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0673
Regulation (EU). 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
(OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1)
Regulation (EU, Euratom). No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political
foundations, (OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p.1).
Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on online hate speech. (2019).
(A/74/486). Retrieved from
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A_74_486.pdf
Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on online content regulation.
(2018). (A/HRC/38/35). Retrieved from https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/096/72/PDF/G1809672.pdf?OpenElement
Schoenbach, K., & Lauf, E. (2004). Another Look at the ‘Trap’ Effect of Television—and Beyond.
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 16(2), 169–182.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/16.2.169
Shearer, E. (2018, December 10). Social media outpaces print newspapers in the U.S. as a news
source. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/
Šimunjak, M., Nenadić, I., & Žuvela, L. (2019). National report: Croatia. In E. Novelli & B.
Johansson (Eds.), 2019 European Elections Campaign: Images, topics, media in the 28
Member States (pp. 59–66). Brussels: European Parliament.
Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and
political manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 21 December 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
Sounding Board. (2018). The Sounding Board’s Unanimous Final Opinion on the so-called Code
of Practice on 24 September 2018. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation
The Transatlantic High Level Working Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of
Expression. (2019). How governments and platforms have fallen short in trying to moderate
content online (Co-Chairs Report No. 1 and Working Papers). Retrieved from
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/TWG_Ditchley_intro_and_papers_June_2019.pdf
Valeriani, A., & Vaccari, C. (2016). Accidental exposure to politics on social media as online
participation equalizer in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. New Media & Society,
18(9). https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444815616223
Venice Commission. (2013). CDL-AD(2013)021 Opinion on the electoral legislation of Mexico,
adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 45th meeting (Venice, 13 June 2013) and
by the Venice Commission at its 95th Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 June 2013).
Venice Commission. (2010). CDL-AD(2010)024 Guidelines on political party regulation, by the
OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 84th
Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 2010).
Venice Commission. (2009). CDL-AD(2009)031 Guidelines on media analysis during election
observation missions, by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) and the Venice Commission, adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections
at its 29th meeting (Venice, 11 June 2009) and the Venice Commission at its 79th Plenary
Session (Venice, 12- 13 June 2009).
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science,
359(6380), 1146–1151. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559
Wakefield, J. (2019, February 18). Facebook needs regulation as Zuckerberg 'fails' - UK MPs.
BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47255380
Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary
framework for research and policymaking [Report No. DGI(2017)09]. Strasbourg: Council of
Europe. Retrieved from https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PREMS-
162317-GBR-2018-Report-de%CC%81sinformation-1.pdf?x56713
Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. J., Möller, J., Kruikemeier, S. Ó Fathaigh, R., Irion, K., Dobber, T.,
Bodo, B., de Vreese, C. H. (2018). Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for
Democracy. Utrecht Law Review, 14(1), 82–96. https://doi.org/10.18352/ulr.420
FOOTNOTES
1. The so-called ‘fake news’ law was passed in May 2019 allowing ministers to issue orders to
platforms like Facebook to put up warnings next to disputed posts or, in extreme cases, to take
the content down. The law also allows for fines of up to SG$ 1 million (665,000 €) for
companies that fail to comply, and the individual offenders could face up to ten years in prison.
Many have raised the voice against this law, including the International Political Science
Association (IPSA), but it came into effect and is being used.
2. To which the author is affiliated.
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3. The GDPR supplanted the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data (PII (US)) and on the free movement
of such data).
4. The Council of Europe also uses the term ‘quality journalism’ but it is not fully clear what is
entailed in ‘quality’ and who decides on what ‘quality journalism’ is, and what is not. The aim
could be (and most likely is) to distinguish journalism that respects professional standards from
less reliable, less structured and less ethical and professional standards bound forms of content
production and delivery. Many argue that journalism already entails the request for quality so
this attribute adjective is not necessary and, in fact, may be problematic.
5. Dark advertising is a type of online advertising visible only to the advert's publisher and the
intended target group.
